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1. Introduction
Price fixing is an essential part of Initial Public Offering Process2, whereby company es-
tablishes a a price regarding shares which are to be issued publicly via stock market. It is also 
the most controversial part of the Process, due to the fact that the interests of issuers and 
investors are contradictory. The underwriter is also in a a very difficult position as he has to 
reconcile the interests of both sides. On one end there are shareholders, usually with their 
overestimated expectations, based on traditional valuation methods, on the opposite there 
are demands of aggressive investors, who expect above average returns and are willing to un-
derrate actual possibilities of an issuing company to generate profits.
Investors
position in this fight is significantly stronger, since most often the issuer is more determined to col-
lect capital because of scarce resources available, while investors have broad latitude in choosing 
kinds of investment. Such a a situation exists particularly with regard to companies of the same sort, 
already available on the market. Because of aforementioned investors’
power, the “market voice” plays a a decisive role in practically all public offerings.
Issuing price cannot be too high as this might cause Public Offerings to fail. Conversely, 
lowering issuing price may lead to low income from the whole process and it may not always 
1 Author is a fifth year  law student at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow.
2 All phases of this process are described in s.j. Choi, A.C. Pritchard, Securities Regulation: Cases and 
Analysis, Foundation Press 2008, Second Edition, p. 421.
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be compensated by benefits from growing value of shares on a a secondary market. It is advis-
able for a a company to hire a a professional entity to conduct the whole process on its behalf. 
This role is usually performed by underwriters or other advisory bodies. Intermediaries ac-
tively participate in all phases of the process assisting the issuer by performing three critical 
tasks3. Firstly, they provide advice on the structure of the company and the offered securities 
(quantity and price). Secondly, they help companies in the registration process by preparing 
all the necessary documents (disclosure documents etc.). Thirdly, they play a a marketing role 
by assisting in selling securities to the public through soliciting investors, utilizing their con-
tacts with institutional investors etc. This is recommended also because a a correct price is 
essential and the pricing process is sophisticated and complex. The risk of failure of the whole 
issuance exists and if it takes place, the costs incurred are huge. Instead of additional capital, 
company might sustain losses. Therefore, if a a company wants to conduct a a successful is-
suance i.e. sell the whole offering and maximize its profits, it has to determine the price of 
securities on an appropriate level which is beneficial for all interested parties. To achieve this, 
a a well-structured pricing process is necessary.
Generally, three main pricing methods are known, i.e. fixed price, book building and auc-
tion system. In practice, clear-cut methods never occur, as hybrid approaches combining the 
three are the rule. A A thorough review of literature concerning this topic is beyond the scope 
of this article. The purpose of this essay is, firstly, to take a a closer look at Polish legislation 
concerning issuing price to present the requirements set by law in respect of determining the 
issuing price. Subsequently, the article aims to present and describe the most popular pric-
ing methods including innovations and hybrid forms, concentrating on their advantages and 
disadvantages. The analysis of available solutions will be followed by conclusions and sugges-
tions regarding evaluation and choosing the best alternative for an issuer.  
2. Issuing price in Polish law
Regulations regarding  issuing price are not very extensive in Polish law and they are lo-
cated in two acts: “Commercial Companies Code 2000” (hereinafter CCC), which regulates 
the formation, structure, operation and dissolution of main legal forms for conducting busi-
ness, and “Act on Public offer and the conditions for introducing financial instruments to the 
organized trading system and on Public Companies”(hereinafter POA – my own translation), 
which regulates together, with two other Acts4, a a significant part of Polish capital market.
3 Ibidem, p. 418.
4 “Act on Trading Financial Instruments” and “Act on Capital Market Supervision” both dated July 29th 2005. 
These three acts where introduced to amend already obsolete acts regulating this area of the law.
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Issuing price, according to article 432 § 1 point 4 of CCC, is established by General Meeting 
of Shareholders. However, this solution is usually impractical due to the fact that the issu-
ing price has to be adjusted to the market price. Therefore, aforementioned article stipulates 
that the resolution concerning rising share capital may delegate the power to management 
board or supervisory board5. Whether it is possible to delegate this power to both bodies 
is disputable and the view rejecting such a a possibility seems to prevail in literature6. That 
approach is more persuasive because of the conjunction used in the act: “or” (albo in Polish 
version), which from the logical standpoint means that the solutions are mutually exclusive 
and because of practical implications. The aim of this delegation is to, inter alia, avoid conflicts 
within a a company and to accelerate and simplify the whole process. Because establishing 
the issuing price is arguably a a management act, it is recommended to delegate this power to 
management board. This decision would also follow international tendency observed in many 
jurisdictions which is to extend powers of the management board7. It is not possible for the 
authorized body to delegate this power further, to another entity.
As article 308 § 2 in connection with article 431 § 7 CCC sets forth, the issuing price must 
not be lower than the nominal price, however, it might be higher. The surplus, being the dif-
ference between issuing price and nominal price (agio), is required by law to be transferred to 
reserve capital. Agio has to be paid in whole prior to registration of raised capital. The price 
might be set by indicating the formula to count it. However the formula has to be precise and 
the data on which it relies has to be easily accessible. 
The most controversial aspect of the whole process of price fixing is the question whether 
it is lawful to differentiate the price within the offering. The problem is disputable as pur-
suant to article 20 CCC shareholders have to be treated equally in the same circumstances. 
Furthermore, this differentiation might be also questioned because of the article 15 section 
1 point 3 “Unfair Competition Act” where it is prohibited to introduce “difficulties for other 
entrepreneurs to access the market through: materially unjustified differences in the treat-
ment of some consumers” (my own translation). This conflict of laws has been analyzed in 
literature8. Relevant conclusions are that generally it is admissible to differentiate the price 
especially in Public offerings. Nevertheless, it is agreed that it is prohibited in a a closed offer 
(rights offerings)9 i.e. one with right issue – addressed exclusively to an issuer’s pre-existing 
5 In Poland only two-tier structure of Board of Directors is allowed.
6 E.g. W. Popiołek, [in:] J.A. Strzępka et al. Kodeks Spółek Handlowych – Komentarz, 2003, Second Edition, 
p. 1253–1254 or J. Frąckowiak, [in:] K. Kruczalak et al. Komentarz KSH, Warszawa 2001, p. 706.
7 Reforms in this direction were conducted in Switzerland and Germany. In US this power is vested in 
board of directors, unless statutory provisions state otherwise – J. Cox, Sum and Substance of Corpora-
tions, Chicago, 1984, p. 279. 
8 See e.g. S. Sołtysiński et al.,,Kodeks Spółek Handlowych. Suplement do Tomów I-IV, C.H. Beck 2010 and 
complex analysis [in:] M. Romanowski, Zróżnicowanie ceny emisyjnej akcji w świetle Kodeksu Spółek 
Handlowych, Przegląd Prawa Handlowego,  October 2003. 
9 s.j. Choi, A.C. Pritchard, Securities…, p. 10.
35
M. Grzesik Setting issuing price for Initial Public Offering
shareholders respecting their pre-emptive rights. There are many examples when differentia-
tion is justified and used in practice. For example this is the case when:
a a special tranche of shares is prepared for clients to bind them with the company,1. 
it is used to achieve aims of social policy such as having dispersed ownership particularly 2. 
when State is an offeror,
preferences are given for investors who subscribe in short notice or take part in book 3. 
building, or acquire significant amount of shares10.
The most interesting case when differentiation is permissible is when it is considered as 
a payment for the underwriter. The substance of underwriting agreement in Poland is slightly 
different than in US, despite the fact that the institution as such stems from US11. In Po-
land this agreement is still considered as contractus innominati12. Its aim is to prevent an issu-
ance from failure13. In “Act on Trading Financial Instruments”, dated July 29, 2005, two kinds 
of underwriting are typified: subemisja inwestycyjna (investment underwritng) and subemisja 
usługowa (service underwriting). In the former, an underwriter agrees to purchase all unsub-
scribed shares. In the latter underwriter agrees to act as intermediary and as a a dealer in the 
process of selling shares. To do that he purchases all shares and is afterwards responsible for 
selling them to the public. Agreements described above deviate from two common types of 
underwriting agreements distinguished in US i.e. firm commitment and best effort. Never-
theless, parties are free to exercise the liberty to formulate contracts according to their pref-
erences, including verified American best practices. An underwriting agreement ultimately 
leads to costs connected with commission for the underwriter to compensate him for bearing 
the risk of an offering failing. Salary dependents upon the type of underwriting agreement 
used, since the risk is not the same in the two methods. Discount is a a widely used form of 
salary, whereby underwriter purchases shares for a a price lower from the one they are offered 
for the public. The difference between prices constitutes underwriter’s profit (underwriting 
spread). Due to the fact that the underwriter’s role in the process is significant14 and the fact 
that he takes the risk by obliging himself to buy a a specific amount of shares before any in-
formation is disclosed and before subscription even starts, the differentiation of the issuing 
price is widely accepted15 and practical. Otherwise artificial constructions have to be tailored 
10 M. Romanowski, Zróżnicowanie…, p. 5.
11 E. Frankowski, Gwarantowanie emisji w prawie amerykańskim i polskim, Przegląd Prawa Handlowego, 
February 2003, p. 35
12 It means the contract which is not explicitly designed by law but rather is construed by practice of law – 
compare –   M. Romanowski, Prawo o publicznym obrocie papierami wartościowymi – komentarz, C.H. 
Beck, Warszawa 1999; M. Pawełczyk, Treść umowy subemisyjnej, Przegląd Prawa Handlowego,  August 
2003; E. Frankowski, Gwarantowanie…
13 G. Domański, Umowa o submisję inwestycyjną w publicznym obrocie papierami wartościowymi, Przegląd 
Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego, 1999, No. 1.
14 See footnote No. 2.
15 E.g. M. Romanowski,  Zróżnicowanie….
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such as a a salary for an underwriter described as monetary consideration calculated as an 
agreed percent of the value of shares. In view of the arguments discussed above, the stand-
point that differentiation of the issuing price is allowed should be approved with the reserva-
tion that at least some motives stemming from particular circumstances ought to tip in favor 
of this divergence as baseless differentiation might be successfully questioned.  
In principle, the issuing price should match the market price or, in absence thereof, be as 
high as possible, as this lies with the interest of a a company16. If price is fixed on a a lower 
rate, the responsible authority might be subject to civil or even criminal liability. CCC allows 
setting the issuing price lower than the market price, or in the absence thereof, lower than 
fair price. However, arguably it is allowed only if shareholders are exercising their preemptive 
rights17. Such a a decision may cause conflicts between the shareholders’ and the company’s 
interests18.
The POA, which is only applicable to Public offerings19, in article 54 stipulates that issuing 
price does not have to be included in a a Prospectus if:
a) maximum price is at least indicated or the rules of establishing the price are indicated in 
a Prospectus or
b) if it is indicated in a a Prospectus that the person who had subscribed for shares before the 
issuing price was announced has a a right to withdraw. Nevertheless, if the final price is not 
included in the Prospectus the offeror is obliged to immediately inform the Commission 
(Polish Financial Supervision Authority) and public about it, in the same way the Prospec-
tus was released and according to other provisions specified in this act.  
In the context of legislation described above, in most instances it will be the management 
that will decide on the issuing price, at least formally. As very often management lacks the 
required knowledge and resources, it resorts to professionals specializing in supplying these 
particular services. However, hiring a a professional entity does not deprive the management 
of power and influence over major decisions concerning issuing price. Consequently, one of 
the main choices that the management would have to make is the pricing method which will 
be used in the process of setting the issuing price. In the further paragraphs the alternatives 
available for management will be described.
16 j. MacNeil, Shareholders’ Preemptive Rights, Journal of Business Law, 2002, No. 1, p. 79, 93-95.
17 S. Sołtysiński et al., Kodeks….
18 Ibidem.
19 Public offering is defined in article 3 of PAO as an offer to at least 100 investors or to the public as 
a whole.
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3. Book building
The first method is book building. Book building is the process whereby investment banks 
try to collect information about the demand and valuations with regard to issuance of shares. 
Simultaneously they are marketing a a public offer of equity shares of a a company. For this 
purpose they take various steps e.g. conduct road shows, one-to–one meetings with potential 
investors, undertaken prior to setting the price. Through other methods (see post), underwrit-
ers also have a a leeway to ask for indication of interest. However,  it is emphasized in literature 
that: “without the ability to make allocations dependent on the information reported, there is 
no way for underwriters to give investors the incentive to report their information accurately”20. 
This is the most popular and widely-used pricing method although auctions, fixed price systems 
and hybrids forms are also available (e.g. competitive IPO21). As the main purpose of a a pricing 
process is to overcome information asymmetries, all pricing methods are devices designed to 
address this problem. In IPO, evaluation process of issuers is challenging because there are no 
prior reports or analysis. Therefore, very often the “free rider” problem arises, whereby a a per-
son who sacrificed time and money to evaluate the firm may be squeezed out by numerous free 
riders22 who take advantage of the other’’s effort without making any contribution themselves. 






20 A.E. Sharman, IPOs and Long Term Relationship: An advantage of Book Building, The Review of Financial 
Studies, Fall 2000, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 697–714.
21 S. Bonini, O. Voloshyna, A, B or C? Experimental tests of IPO mechanisms, European Financial Manage-
ment, Forthcoming, available at. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972208  (3.03.2011), 
p. 3; also T. Jenkinson, and H. Jones, Bids and Allocations in European Bookbuilding, journal of Finance, 
Vol. 59, No. 5, 2004, 2309–2338.
22 A. Sherman, S. Titman, Building the IPO order book: underpricing and participation limits with costly 
information, Journal of Financial Economics 65/2002, p. 3–29.
23 Agarwal sanjip, Bharat’s Manual of Indian Capital Market, Bharat’s Law House, New Delhi 1997, p. 577.
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Book building discloses more information than any other method as during the meet-
ings with prospective investors the issuer is willing to share inside information in exchange 
for indication of demand and the price the potential buyers are willing to pay. Therefore 
some say that only questionable-quality sellers use auctions. However, it is not entirely true 
as it is rather easy-to-evaluate firms who use auction format, due to the fact that informa-
tion is already available on the market24. The quality of the information disclosed in book 
building is also deemed more trustworthy25 as it is provided by the issuer himself or his 
agents who have strong incentives to disclose information as accurately and completely as 
it is possible. It is worth emphasizing that in book building underwriters can control the 
information about the issuer and coordinate participation of investors. This is considered 
as the main advantage of the system due to the fact that it reduces the risk for both issuers 
and investors26. Furthermore, it allows shares to be preferentially allocated. However, this 
fact is regarded by some as controversial27 because, arguably, allocations could be abused 
to generate kickbacks for underwriters. Opponents of this view advocate contrary position, 
which is that allocation power could improve pre-market price discovery28. Due to this, it is 
indicated in literature that unlike in auction, in book building some investors are kept out 
of the allocation process and, in consequence, access to shares is not equal. The aforemen-
tioned issuers’’ tool may also be used to coerce investors to participate in subscription by 
implying that they will be withdrawn from future offerings.
It should be emphasized that, unlike in fixed price method which involves pre-issue costs 
and risks of failure, in book building this burden can be overcome by withdrawal from the 
market, if demand for securities is unsatisfactory.
Another issue worth noting is that the book building method is widely recommended by 
underwriters and analysts. It provides the issuer with analyst coverage, which is very advan-
tageous for them. “Analysts hype”, proposed in literature as an explanation for popularity 
of analyzed method, suggests that: “the book building procedure entails a a tacit agreement 
between issuers and banks. Issuers are willing to pay the higher direct and indirect costs of 
book building in exchange for increased and more favorable analyst coverage”29. This view, in 
my opinion, successfully mirrors the truth as most often issuers are more concerned with the 
positive outcome of the offering rather than the costs incurred. Underwriters act as gatekeep-
24 T. Jenkinson, A. Ljungqvist, Going Public The Theory and Evidence on How Companies Raise Equity Fi-
nance, 2nd Ed. Oxford University Press, 2001.
25 A.E. Sherman, Global Trends in IPO Method: Bookbuilding vs. Auctions, available at: 
www.nd.edu/~finance/020601/news/Sherman%20Paper.doc (3.03.2011).
26 A.E. Sherman, Global Trends in IPO: Book building versus auctions with endogenous entry, journal of 
Financial Economics, 2005, No. 78, p 615–649, available at www.sciencedirect.com.
27 A. Bubna, N.R. Prabhala, When bookbilding meets IPOs, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972757 (3.03.2011).
28 Ibidem.
29 F. Degeorge, F. Derrien, K. Womack, Analyst Hype in IPOs: Explaining the Popularity of Bookbuilding, 
Review of Financial Studies, 2007, Vol. 20, No. 4, p. 1021-1058.
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ers, and supply the issuers with a a “certification mechanism”30 which by virtue of their repu-
tation is supposed to attract more investors. It is also submitted by scholars in the field that 
book building, in comparison to fixed price, generates more proceeds31.
The main reason why book building is criticized is that it encourages underpricing, hence 
the issuer leaves more money on the table. Yet, regardless of the method used, almost every 
IPO is underpriced32 and, as described below, auction system also does not prevent that. 
Moreover, offerings with higher expected underpricing will have lower expected aftermar-
ket volatility33. In addition, underpricing is usually considered as a a reward for investors, 
since process of collecting information is very costly and time-consuming. According to 
Wilhelm34 some money has to be left on the table as a a compensation for participation in 
price discovery, thus in creating market for a a new security35. Another drawback of book 
building method is the agency problem between issuer and underwriter, as it is profitable 
for the latter to underprice the shares in order to obtain higher profit. Furthermore, as 
previously explained, underwriters enjoy discretion over allocation of shares, which may 
lead to abuses such as spinning and laddering36. In laddering prospective investors promote 
inflated pre-IPO prices to obtain greater allotment from the offering. In spinning, which is 
a a kind of quid pro quo arrangement, the shares are allocated to major executives of a a com-
pany unrelated to the issuer. In return the executives would recommend to their clients to 
do business with the issuer. This highly unethical process is mutually beneficial for both 
sides of the transaction.
30 B. Jovanovic, B. Szentes, IPO Underpricing: Auctions vs. Book Building, 2007, p. 3 – available at www.nyu.
edu/econ/user/jovanovi/ipou.pdf (13.08.2010).
31 Among others see – L.M. Benveniste and W.Y. Busaba, Bookbuilding vs. Fixed Price: An Analysis of Com-
peting Strategies for Markeing IPO, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analsis, Vol. 32, No. 4/1997, 
p. 383–403.
32 Ibidem, p. 1.
33 A. Sherman, Global Trends in IPO Methods: Book…, p. 2.
34 William J. Wilhem Jr., Bookbuilding, auctions, and the future of the IPO process, journal of Applied Cor-
porate Finance, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 2005.
35 “And as Wilhelm also points out, the dominant practice for taking companies public, known as “bookbuilding,” 
is well designed to accomplish price discovery in a cost-effective way. By eliciting expressions of interest 
mainly from large institutional investors, the book manager (or, increasingly, managers) is able to build the 
demand curve for a market that did not previously exist. Those investors who make the greatest contribu-
tion to the price discovery process by providing valuable information and making the issue a success must 
be compensated. The compensation is provided by setting the offering price below the best estimate of fair 
value and allocating more shares to those who provide more valuable information on a consistent basis”. 
–  R. Jagannathan, A.E. Sharman, Reforming the bookbuilding Process for IPO’s, journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, Winter 2005, Vol. 17, p. 67–72.
36 T. Jenkinson, H. Jones, Competitve IPOs, p. 4 – available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1331371 (3.03.2011).
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4. Fixed Price (open offer)
This method has been particularly popular in the UK and its former colonies, several Eu-
ropean markets as well as in US best-efforts38 IPO’s39. It is the simplest pricing method and, 
as such, is particularly admired in small markets and for smaller, short-existing issuers. The 
most characteristic attribute of that method is that price is determined prior to setting the of-
fer price and it is done without first soliciting the investors’ demand. Thus the price at which 
securities are offered and would be allotted is known in advance to the investors. The price is 
determined by discretionary decision of the issuer or the underwriter, made after taking into 
account all relevant facts and opinions, including business evaluation. Price is identical for all 
37 Mukesh Kr. singh, Book Building Process, available at. www.scribd.com/doc/5544374/Book-Building-Pro-
cess (12.08.2010).
38 The best effort method is described in S.J. Choi, A.C. Prichard, Securities …, p. 419.
39 W.Y. Busaba, C. Chang, Bookbuilding vs. Fixed Price Revisited: The effect of Aftermarket Trading, journal of 
Corporate Finance, Forthcoming, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1536847 
(3.03.2011).
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investors. Notably, unlike book building method, issuer or underwriter has no power over the 
allotment of shares. Scholars indicate that fixed price: “allows issuers to control price, but not 
allocations, book building allows issuers to control both, and standard auctions do not allow 
issuers to control either”40. According to Chemmanur and Liu41: “fixed price offers allow the is-
suer to induce a a higher level of information acquisition but do not allow the offering price to 
reflect the information acquired”. Also there is lesser flexibility in pricing as compared to book 
building. There is no Qualified Investment Buyers’’ allocation, therefore issuance mostly relies 
on retail investors. There is a a trend for small investors to be favored in fixed – price public of-
fers42. Underpricing exists for the same reasons as in book building process, described above. 
The size of the discount might be either bigger or lower than that in book building method43 
as there is no empirical data proving otherwise. As it is showed by scholars: “fixed price of-
fers are consistently chosen over IPO auctions in almost all countries that allow and have had 
experience with both methods”44. This method can lead to an under-evaluation of the issuing 
company as the price of the offered shares is usually lower than market value. On the contrary, 
if the price is established too high the amount of investors might be too low and consequently 
the issuance may fail.
Furthermore, despite being active and useful in book building process, institutional inves-
tors are usually not interested in participating in fixed price public issues because there is no 
guarantee of allotment and no opportunity costs are involved45. This method may only be 
profitable for issuers who are confident about their value and high level of demand for securi-
ties they are offering, otherwise it is extremely risky. Without credible valuations and market 
analysis, discovery of the issuing price, frankly, amounts to guessing. 
5. Auction
Auction, on the other hand, is a a much less popular pricing device. Although, it has been 
tried in more than 20 countries, only 4 still use it – France, Israel, Taiwan and the U.S. However 
40 T. Chemmanur, H.M Liu, How should a firm go public? A dynamic model of the choice between fixed price 
offerings and auctions in IPO’s and privatizations, available at http://gatton.uky.edu/faculty/lium/ipoauc-
tion.pdf (3.03.2011).
41 Ibidem.
42 “In a fixed-price offering, information collected during the subscription period arrives too late to be used 
in pricing the offering, so it is optimal to favor small orders to reduce the risk that the offering will fail. 
For book building, information that is revealed during the marketing stage can later be used to set the 
price” B. Chowdhry, A. Sherman, The winner’s course and international methods of allocating initial pub-
lic offerings, Pasific Basin Finance Journal, 4/1996, p. 15–30.
43 It is subject to contrary views – look – ibidem, p. 5.
44 Jagannathan R. and A.E Sherman, Why Do IPO Auctions Fail ?, available at http://www.mccombs.utexas.
edu/dept/finance/wk_papers/Ravi.pdf (3.03.2011).
45 Mukesh Kr. singh, Book Building…
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even there, it is an exception rather than the rule46. In other countries, even if auction was used, 
it has been abandoned before even book building was introduced47. Auction system exists in di-
verse forms amidst which Dutch auction, also called standard or uniform price auction48, is the 
most admired49. It enables the issuer to set the price at a a clearing price (the lowest successful 
bid). The other variations of auctions include for example, discriminatory or pay what-you-bid 
auctions, or the recently proposed Ausubel auction50. 
It is said that issuers who employ auction system incur less costs as direct fees and under-
pricing costs are lower. Nevertheless empirical data indicates that underpricing exists – the 
Google case (described later in the text) is the best example. Auction is also a a more egalitar-
ian and fair process. Not only do all investors have the same access to shares, but also the price 
is equal. Auction system is highly recommended and widely used for state bonds’51 issuance 
where information about the issuer is well-known and identity and quantity of investors are 
accessible52.
Standard auctions are definitely more transparent due to the fact that managers are not 
furnished with discretion over allocation of shares the way they are in book building. It is 
emphasized that it should act as a a good measure to prevent the financial scandals and public 
concerns which were triggered in the past especially in US53. 
46 Jagannathan, R. and A.E. Sherman, Why Do IPO Auctions Fail? manuscript, 2004. “Auctions continue to 
be used on the unregulated over-the-counter market in France but seem to have dried up on the major 
exchanges since unrestricted bookbuilding was first allowed in 1999. In Taiwan, the use of IPO auctions 
has fallen over time, with issuers returning to the traditional fixed price public offers. The book building 
method is allowed but restricted and has not been popular in Taiwan. In Israel, IPO issuers were required 
to use auctions for a decade, ending in Dec. 2003. The first IPO following the expiration of the law, Tesco, 
used an auction but the two succeeding IPOs returned to the fixed price method. Legislation is pending 
in Israel to allow book building. Last, the U.S. has had 11 auctions since the method was introduced in 
1999, a rate of about 2 per year. A 12th IPO auction was announced in December, 2004”.  
47 IPO auctions were also used in Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K. in the 1980s, and in 
Singapore and Turkey in the 1990s.
48 “A Dutch auction, according to the original use of the term, is an open, descending-price auction. The clos-
est sealed-bid equivalent of the Dutch auction would be a discriminatory, or pay-what-you-bid, auction. 
The uniform price auction in a setting such as for IPOs would be closer to (although not quite identical 
to) a Vickrey auction, a multi-unit extension of the single-unit second price auction proposed by Nobel 
Prize winning economist William Vickrey”. – R. Jagannathan, A.E. Sharman, Reforming the bookbuilding 
Process for IPO’s, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 2005, Vol. 7, No. 1: 67-72, p. 5.
49 Other types of auctions described in L.M. Ausubel, Implications of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets, 
Brooking-Wharton papers on Financial Services, 2002, p. 313-343.
50  S. Bonini, O. Voloshyna, A, B or C?..., p. 3 also Ausubel, L., An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction of Multiple 
Objects, American Economic Review, 2004, Vol. 94, No. 5, p. 1452-1475.
51 “For the weekly auctions of 13-week U.S. Treasury bills, the cost of evaluation is negligible because so 
many close substitutes already are trading, including the off-the-run bills and the new bills trading in 
the when issued market”, A.E. Sherman, Global trends…, p. 4.
52 R. Jogannathan, A. Sherman,  Why Do IPO Auctions Fail?, October 2006, p. 4.
53 See – V. Pons-Sanz, Who benefits from IPO underpricing? Evidence from hybrid bookbuilding offerings, 
Working Paper Series European Central Bank, No. 428, January 2005, p. 8.
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Despite numerous advantages, issuers are reluctant to apply auction format54. They are 
not fond of experimental methods55 and underwriters’’ pressure usually encourages them to 
use other equivalents56. However, there are also other reasons. Firstly, large number of po-
tential bidders makes the price inaccurate, since the price might be “noisy” i.e. based only on 
demand. Secondly, fluctuations in amount of bidders are also cumbersome as they can lead to 
undersubscription and consequently failure of whole offering. Unlike book building, in auc-
tion entry is random57 because, as was stated above, underwriters are armed with no tools to 
coordinate the number of investors58. What is more, shares priced by auction do not exhibit 
better long-term performance. There are also problems concerning manipulations during the 
auction such as: bidding rings, manipulative biddings59 and, as it is stated by some: “surrender 
of rents for the IPO-ing firm acts to keep the worst firms out of BB (book building), and this 
adverse selection can destroy the auction market altogether”60.
Another argument against auction system (uniform price variation) corresponds with the 
aforementioned advantage of book building method. It is highlighted that auction does not 
provide those who gather information with proper reward, which aggravates free-rider prob-
lem. As a a result, the price established in auction is likely to be “noisy”, and very inaccurate 
which may cause instability on the market61. However, the free rider problem is eliminated in 
discriminatory auctions as the bidder must pay the price he bid.
Allegedly, the most well known case where the auction system was exploited was Google. As 
factual background indicates, in 2003 it employed modified Dutch auction format in its IPO. It 
turned out that the system failed to meet associated expectations, therefore the question arose 
whether it would have been better for Google to use traditional, well-known book building 
54  Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, Going Public: The theory and Evidence on how Companies Raise Equity Fi-
nance, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996 comment: “Auction-like mechanisms such as tenders in the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium, or offres publiques de vente in France, are generally associated 
with low levels of underpricing; most Chilean IPOs have also used auctions, and have been modestly 
underpriced, at least by emerging-markets standards. This is not surprising, given that, unlike fixed-price 
offers, tenders allow market demand to at least partially infuence the issue price. What is curious, though, 
is that we do not observe a shift towards greater use of auctions”. Darrien and Womack, Auctions vs. 
Bookbuilding and the control of Underpricing in Hot IPO Markets, Review of Financial Studies, November 
2001 – make similar comments.
55 Even though action system is used for a very long time for different purposes, it is still quite new, not 
widely used  and results are unpredictable, thus employment thereof is considered experimental.
56 However look – R. Jagannathan, A.E. Sharman, Reforming …, where authors convincingly are contradicting 
this argument.   
57 Ibidem, p. 7.
58 “A study of U.K. privatization tenders between 1982 and 1987 reported that three of the six were under-
subscribed, while one was 500% oversubscribed. In 1994, the auction tranche of Sunright, the last IPO 
auction in Singapore, was 82% undersubscribed, even though the public offer tranche a few days earlier 
had been oversubscribed”., R. Jagannathan, A.E. Sharman, Reforming…, p. 5.
 Ibidem, p. 7 and other examples in R. Jogannathan, A. Sherman,  Why Do IPO…
59 P. B. Oh, The Dutch auction Myth, 2007, Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 42, p. 853, 2007,  p. 44–57 available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=890127 (3.03.2011).
60 B. Jovanovic, IPO underpricing: Auctions …, p. 3.
61 R. Jagannathan, A.E. Sharman, Reforming…, p. 6.
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process. This case might be successfully used for evaluation and analysis of two methods of 
pricing process i.e. book building and auction.
In the Google case62 the issuer used modified Dutch auction system (dirty auction). This 
fact should be stressed because it implies many consequences. Google employed 28 under-
writers, which is a a lot especially in clear Dutch auction where there should be no underwrit-
ers at all. The issuer also quietly allocated 15% of shares to them outside the auction process63. 
Notably, Google did not use clearing price as it lowered it significantly64 just before the offer. 
In light of the facts outlined above, undoubtedly, the Google IPO was a a “controlled ex-
periment”. As it turned out it did not produce hoped-for results. The variation of auction 
used in this offer deviated materially from the original solution of Dutch auction proposed by 
scholars and consequently, the offer was underpriced and 300$ million was left on the table. 
This example demonstrates that Google could not decide until the end what pricing method 
it wanted to employ. This hesitation resulted in many errors which in consequence lead to 
underpricing and lost money. 
6. Hybrids
After discussing typical pricing methods at this point it is appropriate to take a a closer 
look on its derivatives because as was mentioned in the introduction, clear-cut pricing meth-
ods are rarely used. Despite their rareness in practice, it was crucial to present those classic 
methods in this article as they are basis for constructing various combinations. Issuers try to 
construct hybrids to avoid problems each method might cause. In this paragraph, a a selection 
of the most interesting, innovative and promising will be discussed.
The first of these methods is called “Competitive IPO”. The name stems from the competi-
tion created among investment banks in course of price discovery. In ordinary book building 
competition between underwriters exists, yet only in the phase when the issuer is supposed 
to choose the lead underwriter. In the hybrid method discussed in this paragraph, issuers 
separate the preparation and the distribution role of investment banks, thereby intensifying 
competition between them throughout the whole process. Not only does this method provide 
issuers with greater control, but also make the fee structure more advantageous. The novelty 
also lies in the fact that banks are informed about their role approximately two weeks before 
62 For more information look – C. Hurt, What Google can’t tell us about Internet auctions (and what it can), 
University of Toledo forthcoming, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=753625 
(3.03.2011).
63 So called Green shoe option – see S.J. Choi, A.C. Pritchard, Securities…, p. 422.
64  Google retained the option of setting final offering price, thus investors were not sure whether clearing 
price would be the final offering price.
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the IPO and a a no-fee clause65 binds during whole process. This method is stuck between 
traditional book building and auction. It is a a response to agency problems occurring in book 
building, whilst it retains the benefits rooted in the involvement of investment banks66. The 
mechanism was introduced by Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein (investment bank) for public 
offering of Pages Jaunes in France in July 2004. Although it turned out to be successful, al-
most no studies exist testing its trustworthiness. More recent offerings utilizing this system 
have taken place mostly in UK. The few commentators who address this issue indicate that 
this method increases competition not only between banks but also between investors thus 
disclosing more information and suffers from less underpricing than traditional book build-
ing67. Despite many advantages, this method has been subject to criticism, particularly from 
investment banks68 which claim that the method in question is merely “a waste of time” and 
amplifies potential conflicts. Moreover, there is no empirical data supporting the conclusion 
that this method reaches better results, therefore issuers are advised to apply caution regard-
ing this proposition.
Ausubel auction system or Ascending-Bid auction for Multiple Objects, as it is also called, 
is the next system to be addressed. As the name indicates it is a a modification of clear auc-
tion system and it is desirable as it combines two properties: simplicity and optimal informa-
tion revelation. Its inventor, Lawrance M. Ausubel, describes the process: “The auctioneer 
announces a a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current 
price whenever they are “clinched,”
and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction 
yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and 
privacy preservation69.
Scholars prove that this method is very effective in price discovery and mitigating underpric-
ing70. Nevertheless, this method has never been tried on equity market (only on Treasury 
Market), thus the result of this mechanism adopted in an IPO is unpredictable. This method 
suffers from the same uncertainty as Competitive IPO, therefore issuers may be reluctant to 
exploit it. The main feature of this system is well defined by Bonini and Voloshyna who state 
that: 
65 If the final price is below the price range, the underwriters’ fees are not paid.
66 T. Jenkinson, H. Jones, Competitve IPO’s, CEPR Discussion Paper, no. 7178, February 2009, available at 
www.cepr.org. (3.03.2011)
67 S. Bonini, O. Voloshyna, A, B or C?…
68 See for investment banks’ critique of this method – H. Wilson, Competitve IPOs Run into New Storm, 
Financial News US, 24 October 2005, www.financialnews-us.com (3.03.2011).
69 L.M. Ausubel, An efficient Ascending-Bid …, p. 1452–1475.
70 S. Bonini, O. Voloshyna, A, B or C?...
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The essential feature of the Ausubel model is that the price paid for marginal units is not connected 
with the price paid for infra-marginal units, hence bidders do not have incentives to bid less than 
their valuations for marginal unit in an attempt to decrease the price of infra-marginal units71. 
Other modifications are also proposed in literature72 or used in practice73, but are not dis-
cussed within the scope of this work.
7. Conclusion
In view of the arguments and factors mentioned in this work it is difficult to draw conclu-
sive remarks. Although every method possesses significant advantages, inherent drawbacks 
are also present in all of them. In endeavor to elect the best alternative for a a potential is-
suer it has to be remembered that only one of the methods is thoroughly verified by practice 
and deeply studied in literature and this method is book building. For these reasons, this 
pricing model is currently the most popular and the most widely-employed by issuers dur-
ing pricing process. In spite of numerous advantages of other methods and the fact that 
they were tried in many countries74, issuers prefer book building as a a safe and trustworthy 
mechanism, even at the cost of higher fees and more money left on the table. Even Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission’s report75, which proposed auction as an advisable alterna-
tive for book building, did not change this. Empirical data indicates that results of using 
Dutch auction are much more unpredictable than book building method. Google IPO acts 
as an example that theoretical considerations are not always mirrored in reality and sheds 
new light on the discussion about auction model. It also provides auction’s opponents with 
additional arguments against it. 
Therefore, book building with its persuasive force based on marketing technique is the best 
alternative for a a seller. If performed accurately it leads to successful offerings in a a situa-
tion where all parties are satisfied. Most issuers are risk-averse and this method offers many 
tools to mitigate risk. I I am inclined to believe that many weaknesses thereof might also be 
avoided. As means of an example, underpricing might be at least circumvented by close coop-
eration with qualified investors who help in determining the perfect issuing price in course 
71 Ibidem, p. 6.
72 R. Jagannathan, A.E. Sherman, Reforming the…
73 E.g. dirty auction or combination of book building and fixed price method when shares are divided into 
tranches e.g. for institutional and retail investors. Shares are then priced using book building or fixed 
price method respectively.  
74 R. Jogannathan, Why do IPO …,  p. 37.
75 See nyse/nasd ipo advisory comm., report and recommendations of a committee convened by the new 
york stock exchange, inc. and nasd at the request of the u.s. securities and exchange commission available 
at, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/rules_regs/p010373.pdf (3.03.2011).
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of book building process. In exchange for trustworthy indication of demand the issuer may 
guarantee fixed allocation of shares, which serves as a a incentive for the investors to satisfy 
him. It should also be emphasized that the issuer is not helpless as he has his own evaluations 
of the enterprise, most often prepared by independent auditors which might be used to detect 
inaccurate indications. The costs which are considered as onerous are worth spending as in 
exchange the issuer is supplied with necessary support from intermediaries and a a relatively 
accurate issuing price. Finally, underpricing, which is so often deemed the main flaw of the 
method, should be rather treated, from either investors’’ and issuer’s standpoint, as inherent 
costs paid for cooperation of all players on capital market. It should also be noted that issuers 
should be extremely cautious about lowering the issuing price underneath the level deter-
mined during book building process. This stems from the fact that despite incentives provided 
for qualified investors, most likely the hope for huge discount would induce investors to in-
dicate the price as low as possible. Thus in the last phase of deciding on the final issuing price 
issuer has to select one of two scenarios:
lowering the price determined in book building to diminish the risk of failure of the of-1. 
fering while most likely leaving more money on the table or
using the price determined in book building or even raising it slightly to leave no money 2. 
on the table but increase the risk of failure.
Both of these issues have to be addressed and reconciled while reaching final decision. The 
chosen outcome will depend on various factors and information available for insiders exclu-
sively thus no general advice might be proposed. 
In choosing the best pricing method every issuer faces trade-offs and has to opt for the one 
alternative he finds most advantageous for him. This article may only serve as a a recommen-
dation and basis for that decision, not as a a clear-cut solution.
